The Economics of Products Liability:
A Reaction to McKean
Robert Dorfmanf

It seems appropriate to begin a discussion of the law and economics of
products liability by reminding ourselves that law and economics are
such very different disciplines that lawyers and economists are bound
to have difficulty in understanding each other's approach to this or
any other topic. The trouble is not merely that we have not studied
each other's subject; the trouble is that from the outset we approach
problems in very different ways and with different purposes in view.
I cannot think except with great diffidence about the lawyer's point of
view, but I believe it to be pre-eminently practical. Whether the lawyer sits on the bench or stands before it, his business is to make social
decisions. In making those decisions he has many things to take into
account, and, in particular, he has to apply the standards of ethics and
justice and mutual obligation that are inscribed in the law.
The economist, on the other hand, is not concerned with reaching
decisions at all. His business is part that of a scientist and part that of a
social critic. His task is to describe the way the world operates and if
possible to describe it so well and so profoundly that he can infer how
the world would operate if conditions were somewhat altered, that is, so
he can predict the consequences of following different policies. These
predictions are sometimes useful for reaching decisions, but they are
not decisions. If a decision is to be reached, one has to add to predictions of different consequences some social scale of values that enables
one to tell which set of consequences is to be preferred. As Professor
McKean has emphasized, economics itself is not equipped with such a
scale of values. So the economist must stop at the point where he can
foretell with either weak or great assurance what consequences will
flow from alternative measures or policies. The politician, the moralist, the journalist or the lawyer is equipped with the requisite set of
values, so that he can make or recommend a decision.
The economist, in short, is preoccupied with descriptions and predictions, the lawyer with legal and equitable decisions. It is no wont Professor of Economics, Harvard University.

92

Products Liability-Dorfman

93

der that economists tend to feel that lawyers have inadequate understanding of the facts of life and employ low standards of analytical
rigor, while lawyers regard economists as wildly impractical types. We
both are right.
In the present instance I suffer from the layman's disability of not
really understanding what the legal issues are. I do understand that
they have to do with the legal liabilities of firms that manufacture
goods and permit them to be placed in the hands of users. Professor
McKean has made it dear to me that the law, as applied to this problem, is in the process of change. I gather that no significant new legislation has been enacted but that the courts in recent years have been
deciding cases in ways that they would not have decided them some
time ago, so that the law is changing and courts are changing it. Now I
can see clearly enough that there is a significant social issue here. People
occasionally do suffer loss or injury as a consequence of the performance of articles that they have purchased. And it is often a matter of
deep human significance to decide who should bear what part of the
burden in such cases and to have a policy on which such decisions can
be based.
I call that a social problem, rather than a legal one, because it concerns social relationships, although the solution to this problem may
be contained in the law. There is an economic problem or question
related to this social problem. That is the question of foretelling the
effects on various aspects of economic behavior of different possible
resolutions of the social problem. Professor McKean insists, and he
is correct, that the solution of the economic problem has a bearing
on the solution of the social problem, for we should certainly want
to resolve the social problem in the best possible way, meaning by this
the way in which all the consequences, including importantly the
economic ones, are as favorable as possible. That states clearly enough
for me how the economist gets into the picture, and what the social
and economic questions are. But what I perceive only vaguely is where
the legal problem lies.
I have to conjecture what the possible answer to that question may
be. One legal problem that I perceive is simply a question of fact:
What is the law on the subject at the present time? That is the kind of
question, I suppose, that is repeatedly before the courts and that
lawyers even outside of court must concern themselves with in order
to give helpful advice to their clients. If that is the problem before
this conference I clearly am incompetent to contribute and I am not
even sure that I am especially interested.
Another possible legal problem can be stated this way: We do not
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have an entirely free hand in resolving the social issue of allocating
the risk of using commodities. There are such things as personal rights
and property rights that are established under common law, our Constitution, accumulated precedents and so on. There are even real
questions as to what legal obligations are practicable and enforceable.
So, there is a real question as to the room for choice in resolving
the social issue in a way that is consistent with all pertinent aspects of
the law. That is a really interesting question, but again I certainly
have no illumination to cast upon it. Still a third possible legal question concerns the roles of statutory law and judge-made law. Is the
current revision of the law of products liability within or beyond the
range of judicial discretion?
None of these conjectures, though, strikes me as very conclusive or
insightful, so I still feel that I must approach this paper without
clearly comprehending what the legal side of the question is all about.
Under the circumstances, I had better devote myself entirely to
the economic question. It will become amply evident in the next few
minutes that Professor McKean and I adhere to different schools of
economics. Our differences are fundamental and are at bottom methodological. Ie believes that you can get to the economic essence of
a problem by simplifying it in a particular way. I believe in simplification, too, because I recognize that the human mind can deal with only
very simple problems, but I am very suspicious of the particular kind
of simplification that Professor McKean regards as being most illuminating. It will be recalled from reading Professor McKean's paper
that his point of departure for the analysis of the economic consequences of different policies with respect to products liability is to
consider the problem in a much simpler world than ours, one in
which there are no costs of gaining information or of negotiating
contracts or of enforcement. That is a very useful conceptual device
for some economic problems. For example, it simplifies the task of
analyzing the consequences that may flow from a vastly cheaper
source of power, such as nuclear energy. But for other purposes that
device can be grossly distorting. For example, it would not be at all
helpful to make an economic analysis of the insurance industry in a
world in which all sources of ignorance and uncertainty have been
assumed away, for the need for insurance would be assumed away
also. So, I tend to regard this methodological device with some suspicion. And, in particular, it seems to me that the analysis of products
liability is dangerously akin to the analysis of insurance.
But it is Professor McKean's privilege to make these assumptions
so long as he follows them to their logical conclusions. And since the

19701

Products Liability-Dorfman

assumptions of zero costs of information, zero costs of transaction, and
zero costs of enforcement have been placed before us, I feel obliged
to draw a conclusion from them-namely, that in such a world, the
problem of products liability would hardly exist. I must now argue
to that conclusion.
First, though, I have to define products liability. The most succinct
statement that I could find in the paper is: "The manufacturer would
simply be held liable for all injuries occurring with the use of his
product, regardless of circumstances." 1 What that definition means,
I think, is that if a Cadillac were to ram a Chevrolet, then General
Motors would be held responsible for all the resultant damage and
injuries, regardless. I cannot believe that the doctrine carried to that
extreme has very much future and, therefore, even at some risk of
deflecting my remarks from their proper track, I should like to base
my discussion on a different definition. My definition is that products
liability concerns the responsibility for any adverse consequences that
may result from the use of the product and that are attributable to
any peculiarities of the product, either of design or of manufacture,
which are different from the specifications conventionally and normally expected from commodities of its type. On re-reading that
definition, I am sure that any lawyer could have done better, but I
think it will suffice as a basis for my discussion. To illustrate my definition, suppose that the head flew off the hammer that a man was
using and injured his child. Under my definition there would be no
products liability if the hammer were of standard design and were
adequately manufactured in the usual way so far as anyone could tell,
because everyone knows that hammer heads of the usual type do fly
off on occasion. But if this hammer had a peculiar patented method
of assembly, and particularly if this novel method of joining was intended to make it safer and was advertised as such, then a question
of products liability would arise, and the social question of who should
bear the financial costs of the accident would be a live issue.
I have now to discuss the status of the problem of products liability
in the sense just proposed and in Professor McKean's world where
there are no costs of gaining information or of negotiation or of
transacting business. To do so, I shall introduce one distinction which
Professor McKean did not make, because it seems to make a difference.
The defects that may give rise to products liability are of two sorts:
defects of design and defects of manufacture. Defects of design are
variations from the normal and standard specifications of the commodity which have been incorporated intentionally in the article
I McKean

text following note 117.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 38:92

sold. The use of a novel method for affixing a hammer head to its
handle is an illustration. Defects in manufacture are unintentional
variations from normal standard specifications. They arise in the
course of manufacture because it is not possible to make any number
of articles identical to one another. Defects in design will be present
in all the articles manufactured according to the same design; defects
in manufacture will be present only sporadically and randomly. It
is the purpose of quality control and inspection to eliminate or at
least reduce the frequency of defects in manufacture, but, as I said,
defects in design are present by intention.
The economic behavior of producers and consumers with respect
to these two kinds of defects is likely to differ. Defects of manufacture
would not exist at all in a world in which information was free, for
then if an article were produced that was defective in some respect,
however recondite, the exact nature of the defect would be known to
everyone who handled the article from the manufacturer to the ultimate purchaser. There would be no need for warranties in that world.
Defective articles, if they were sold at all, would be sold at a discount,
just as in the real world pottery seconds and defective soft goods now
are identified as such and sold. If a purchaser bought a defective article
because its price was cheap and subsequently suffered loss or injury
as a result of the defect, the affair would have an entirely different
cast from what it has in the real world, where the purchaser often has
no practical way of knowing what the article he has purchased is like
inside. At any rate, if we argue from the proposed definition of products liability, a defective article known to be such must necessarily
live up to its own specifications and therefore cannot have any variation from specifications which would expose anyone, either manufacturer or purchaser, to products liability. Products liability caused by
manufacturing defects could not arise in a world in which information
is free.
The situation of design defects in a world of free information is
slightly more complicated. Design defects I take to be of two sorts:
some are purely inadvertent and some arise from attempts to reduce
manufacturing costs. The inadvertent defects arise as when a bolt
that could be placed in any number of places is located at a spot that
tends to be damp in humid weather, leading to premature rusting
and failure. Such ill fortune is common in every complicated apparatus. It is the cause of the change-orders that go out several times a
day at any large automobile plant, moving the locations of the small
attachments, changing bolts to welds and welds to bolts, as experience
accumulates in each model year. Whether this kind of defect would
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occur in a world in which information was free depends upon how
far you want to push the concept of free information.
The phrase "free information" is susceptible of two possible interpretations. The less interesting interpretation, which we can call free
information in the wide sense, means that anyone can obtain freely,
and therefore does obtain, full inforniation about how an article will
operate under the various conditions that it may be expected to encounter. In a world in which information was free in this sense,
engineering would be vastly cheaper and better than it is in our
world. In particular, the inadvertent defects in design would simply
not occur because engineers would be able to foresee all the peculiar
stresses and exposures that were going to beset the equipment that
they were designing. All those change-orders would be unnecessary
in that same world where everyone could foresee without effort the
performance of various articles of manufacture. They would not be
a source of products liability.
The defects that are permitted to remain in the interest of economy
would have a significance entirely different from what they have in
our world. For every purchaser would know precisely what he was
buying and how it was going to perform. Articles designed to low
quality standards would sell at an appropriate discount from higher
quality articles. They could not in fact deviate from the specifications
expected of them, for expectations could not be in error and therefore
no products liability as I have chosen to define the concept could occur. But even waiving the niceties of formal logic, someone in that
world who had purchased an inferior article at an appropriately reduced price could hardly claim indemnification if the article should
fail to perform up to high quality standards, even at a critical juncture.
In short, the concept of products liability would hardly be applicable
in a world where information in the wide sense was free, and therefore we cannot derive any conclusions about products liability in our
world by contemplating that much more perfect and congenial environment. The only conclusion we could validly come to would be
that products liability does not exist.
The other possible interpretation of free information is that complete information about the specifications of articles is freely and
costlessly available. This is not so very different from our world, at
least as far as producers' goods go. In these circumstances, inadvertent
defects of design could certainly occur and therefore there would be
a risk that would have to be borne by somebody every time the design of an article was changed in any respect, no matter how small
and insignificant it might have appeared to be. This risk would give
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rise to products liability and the issue of who should bear it would
certainly be present. In this world also, however, the significance of
defects introduced for economy's sake would be substantially different from the significance of those defects in our world, for every
purchaser would of course be on notice that they are present. Under
.those circumstances, articles manufactured to lower specifications
would sell at comparatively low prices just as if there were free information in the wider sense. And the man who accepted an article
because it was comparatively cheap would thereby be accepting also
the fact that this cheap article would conform to the specifications of
its quality class, although not to the specifications of the most deluxe
quality in its commodity class. Having saved money by accepting
drum brakes, he could not expect indemnification if he experienced an
accident that only disk brakes could avert. So, no issue of products
liability could arise by reason of economical defects in design in a
world of perfect and free information, even in the restricted sense.
I summarize this long excursus into the methodology of simplifying
assumptions by concluding that no questions of products liability could
arise in a world where information in the wide sense was free, and,
in a world where information in the narrower sense was free, they
could arise only in the restricted case of inadvertent defects of design.
On either interpretation of the assumptions, the significance and the
occurrence of products liability would be so wildly different from
what they are in the real world that the assumptions are hardly a first
approximation to the actual problem that confronts us at this meeting. The problem of products liability arises because we live in a
world in which it is costly to obtain full, or even adequate, information about the products we use. We cannot abstract from these costs
without changing the problem in an essential manner.
I have to call attention to another pitfall of economic reasoning.
Virtually all economists, Professor McKean and I among them, are
addicted to thinking about a world in which markets are perfectly
competitive. Practically all of our beautiful theorems about the automatic adjustment of the economic mechanism and the attainment of
a Pareto efficient allocation of resources invoke sooner or later the
assumption that markets are predominantly competitive in the technical sense in which we economists love that word. In this sense, the
word "competitive" means that economic transactions are impersonal,
arm's-length transactions. That is, it means that the purchaser of a
commodity does not care whom he buys it from and that as far as
he is concerned, any unit of the commodity is as satisfactory as any
other unit. When competition is perfect there are no brands, not even
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any name plates, and producers do not sign their products in any
manner whatsoever.
In this connection, it pays to think of fresh apples as a pertinent
example because fresh apples are, I believe, a competitive commodity
in the economist's sense, and furthermore, one can suffer grave injury
as a result of eating fresh apples because apple growers are in the
habit of spraying their products with arsenic and arsenic is bad for
people. Now suppose that someone were to become seriously ill as
a result of eating fresh apples that have been grown by an overenthusiastic or careless apple grower. How would the doctrine of products
liability under its most stringent interpretation apply? In the first
place, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to trace the provenance of such unbranded merchandise; it would be very unlikely for
anyone to know where the offending apple or apples had come from.
The law, no matter how it read, could afford the consumer no recourse. And suppose we were still living under the older doctrine by
which the consumer had to bear the risks of products liability. Professor McKean has argued that consumers could protect themselves by
avoiding the products of producers whose output had been found to
be particularly dangerous or otherwise unsatisfactory. But in a competitive market consumers cannot do this. They cannot know whose
products have been found to be dangerous, and even if they were
to know this, they cannot know whose products they are buying at
any moment. Or, if they can find out both of these things, then the
market is no longer competitive, products are in effect branded, and
all the complicated considerations which cause branded products
and their imperfect markets not to conform to the simple and dandy
theorems of economic optimization come into the picture. Neither
Professor McKean nor I can have it both ways. We cannot argue that
economic markets are perfect and therefore if left to themselves will
lead to Pareto efficient organizations of economic effort, and at the
same time that producers will bear the responsibility for their past
indiscretions.
I therefore find it not a bit surprising that the doctrine of "privity"
was applied in the nineteenth century and for some time thereafter
and now is falling into disrepute. Because along about the end of the
nineteenth century an important change took place in the institutional relationships among producers, purveyors and consumers. The
citadel of privity may not have fallen until very recently, but the decisive breach in the outer works was made long ago at a date that I
do not remember; it was the date when customers began asking their
grocers for a box of Uneeda Biscuits instead of for a pound of soda
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crackers. By a very skillful advertising campaign during the 1890's,
the National Biscuit Company initiated a profound revolution in our
economic institutions. It removed the consumer's loyalty and reliance from his retailer and attached them to the producer. The implication of that revolution is that privileges, responsibilities and
obligations which formerly had belonged to the retailer were transferred to the manufacturer of the branded products. I take it that
the decline of the doctrine of privity is the legal recognition of this
transformation. For once it had been made, the retailer could no
longer assume responsibility for the quality of his merchandise. The
guarantee and the recourse were then transferred from the retailer
to the manufacturer. If this remark is just, then the whole issue that
we are facing today arises in a context of branded merchandise, of
manufacturers who build up reputations and are interested in maintaining them, both by advertising and by maintaining the quality of
their products. Then the issue cannot fruitfully be examined in the
context of a world of perfect markets where anonymous producers
offer their undifferentiated wares to the choice of consumers, who
neither care nor know in whose shop or on whose farm the product
was created.
This circumstance makes the economic analysis both more difficult and more interesting. It means that an adequate analysis would
have to inquire into the strategic considerations of the manufacturers of branded commodities. We should have to inquire into the circumstances under which it was worthwhile for such a manufacturer to
follow a variety of policies. One conceivable policy is to offer low
quality merchandise accompanied, perhaps, by high quality advertising and to estimate that the saving in the cost of manufacture is more
than enough to compensate for the damage to his reputation from
producing a few lemons or otherwise unsatisfactory articles, plus the
cost of whatever indemnities he might have to pay. Another policy
would be to protect his reputation and perhaps economize on his advertising and legal expenses by very careful and expensive design and
quality control. Which of these two policies would be most effective
from the manufacturer's point of view would depend in intriguing
ways on the potency of advertising and, indeed, on the sensitivity of
his reputation to the unfortunate experiences of a few disgruntled
customers. The behavior that I have observed in the real world,
where competition is thoroughly imperfect, is that producers regard
the consequences of having their defects found out to be much more
serious than the costs of any lawsuits that they may incur. This, I take
it, is why the automobile companies are reluctant to recall defective
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products. They would much prefer to pay indemnities in the case of
a few accidents than to have thousands of purchasers know that the
company is in the habit of turning out defective products. This kind
of consideration is excluded by an analysis framed in terms of perfect competition, but I believe that it is essential to an adequate
economic analysis of the consequences of products liability.
To bring the point out clearly, think again of the contrasting positions of the automobile manufacturer and the apple grower. Both
are in danger of producing harmful products, even when they take
all ordinary care to avoid it. The consequences to the apple grower
are perhaps a lawsuit if his product can be traced and liability for the
consumer's losses if the law of products liability attaches the responsibility to him. The consequences to an automobile manufacturer are
damage to his reputation, whether or not the law places responsibility
upon him, and as Professor McKean emphasized at several points in
his argument, this is at least a partial deterrent to lightheartedly distributing defective merchandise. This deterrent, however, is effective
only in the imperfectly competitive cases to which many of the other
arguments put forth by Professor McKean do not apply.
The economic consequences of different social policies with respect to products liability in a world of imperfect markets remain
an open question so far as my knowledge goes-an open and an intriguing question.
I have one further warning to utter. At several points in his paper,
Professor McKean reiterates that part of the economist's creed that has
to do with the law of demand. This is the part of the creed that reads:
I believe with a perfect faith that people will buy less of a commodity
if its price goes up and more of it if its price falls. Of course, I subscribe to this belief wholeheartedly, and of course, Professor McKean,
for his part, is just as aware as I am of the few unimportant exceptions to it. My warning is that this undoubted doctrine is largely
irrelevant to predicting the effects of changing the law of products
liability. What is at issue in products liability is not the psychology of
responses to price changes, but the psychology of responses to changes
in the penalties that will be incurred in very remote contingencies. I
do not question that people will eat more apples if the price falls. I do
question that they will eat more apples or wash them less carefully
if the Northwest Apple Growers Association should undertake to indemnify all people who suffer arsenic poisoning from eating apples.
Businessmen appear to believe that the effect of such an announcement would be, if anything, to inhibit the consumption of apples by
calling attention to the risks entailed. This does not contradict the
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law of demand, and, for all I know, may be a correct appraisal. It does
not seem plausible to me that anyone without a suicidal bent, who
is tempted by a succulent unwashed apple, would say to himself, "The
chances that it will make me sick are very small, and besides, if it does
so, the law of products liability is there to console my heirs and
assigns."
Nor do I question the willingness of people to assume risks in order
to make or to save money. I, myself, have driven for months on worn
tires, trusting to the gods who protect practicing economists that no
emergency would arise. The psychology of risk assumption appears to
be complicated and has a small literature, most of it due to Thomas
Schelling. It appears that people react very differently to two risks of
the same actuarial value, in one of which there is a high probability
of a small loss and in the other a very small probability of a large
loss. Where there is a substantial probability of small or moderate
losses, people act much as Professor McKean says. For example, the
effect of widespread automobile insurance is undoubtedly to induce
people to drive more frequently and with less care than if they were
unprotected against possible losses. This is a case, of course, in which
there is a high probability of a relatively small loss-I presume that
few readers have not been involved in at least a minor automobile
accident in the last two or three years.
But there appears to be a threshold beyond which people's reactions change, because even sophisticated minds find it impossible to
envisage or appreciate contingencies with very low probabilities of
occurrence. People assume risks of one in ten thousand as nonchalantly as they assume those of one in a hundred thousand; the difference is psychologically imperceptible. Aircraft accidents do not appear
to have any effect on air travel, except very sporadically, immediately
after a well-publicized mishap. I do not go so far as to make a positive
assertion that a change in the doctrine of products liability will
have no effect on the willingness of people to use hazardous products
or on the care with which they use them. But I will say that Professor
McKean is on unsafe ground when he asserts that the law of demand
is applicable to such behavior. That is an empirical question, not a
logical consequence of the law.
I am afraid that you have to conclude from my discussion that if you
ask two economists any question, you will get two different answers
or at best one answer and a dissent.

